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Abstract
How have tax systems,  whose primary role is to raise  before  citizens had access to the remainder,  to one with a
resources  to finance  public expenditures,  evolved  in  the  greatly diminished  role for the public sector, as reflected
transition  countries  of Eastern Europe  and the former  in a lower ratio of public  expenditure to GDP, where  the
Soviet  Union? Mitra and Stern find that:  (1) the ratio of  government needs to collect revenue in order to spend.
tax revenue-to-GDP  decreased  largely  due to a fall  in  Can expected  levels of public expenditure  be financed
revenue from corporate  income tax;  (2) the  fall in  by the  basic  instruments of a modern  tax system without
revenue  from the corporate  income tax led to a decline  creating significanit distortions  in the private sector?  The
in the importance  of income  taxes, notwithstanding a  authors suggest that transition  countries, depending on
rise  in the share of individual  income tax;  (3)  social  their stage  of development,  should aim for a tax  revenue-
security contributions  together with payroll taxes became  to-GDP ratio in the range of 22 to 31 percent,
less important  in the Commonwealth  of Independent  comprising  value-added  tax (6 to 7 percent), excises  (2 to
States; and  (4)  domestic indirect taxes  gained in  3  percent),  income tax (6  to 9 percent),  social security
importance  in  overall tax revenues.  contribution  together  with payroll tax  (6 to  10 percent),
Apart from the  increased  role of personal  income  and other taxes such  as on trade  and  on property (2
taxation, these  developments  go in  a direction  opposite  percent).
to those  observed  in poor countries  as they get richer.  The authors' analysis  also sheds  light on  the links
They show a key aspect of transition, namely  a  between tax policy,  tax administration,  and the
movement  from a system where the government  investment  climate  in transition countries.
exercised  a preeminent claim on  output and income
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The transition economies of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union which most
successfully resumed growth and made progress towards a market economy by the end of the
first decade of transition (i) imposed market discipline  on the enterprise sector and (ii)
established an investment climate conducive to the creation of new firms.  These firms
became  the most dynamic sector of the economy and they flourished without  special favors
dispensed by the State.  Figures  1 and 2 show that countries such as Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Poland, Lithuania and Latvia, which witnessed  a quick return to growth, following
the "transitional  recession" which affected all countries, were those where small enterprises
defined as those employing fewer than 50 workers provided-by the end of the 1990s-  over
half of all employment  and value added generated  in the economy.  Moreover,  imposition of
market discipline and creation of an attractive investment climate must go hand in hand:
Figure 3 shows  that countries where budget constraints  on enterprises were softened, usually
through tax exemptions,  fiscal and financial subsidies and tolerance of arrears on payments
of taxes and energy bills to utility companies, and which thereby created barriers to exit, for
unviable firms also saw a low share of aggregate employment in small enterprises'.
lFor more details, see World Bank (2002a)2
Figure 1. Share of  Employment in Small Enterprises,  1989-98
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Figure 2.  Share of Value Added in Small Enterprises,  1989-98
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Figure  3.  Soft Budget Constraints and Employment in Small Enterprises,  2000
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Source:  EBRD (2000); World Bank database on SMEs.
What implications do these findings have for tax systems in the transition countries of
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union?  And, looking ahead, what are the reforms in
tax policy and administration  on which attention should be focused?  These  are the issues
with which this paper is concerned.  Section 2 outlines changes in levels of public
expenditures  and their current structure in order to provide a background  for the tax analysis
that follows. Section 3 sets out the stylized facts regarding tax systems in transition and
relates them to the characteristics of public expenditures  noted in Section 2. Section 4
appeals to comparative  evidence to suggest in what combination different tax instruments
might be used to finance public expenditure  without introducing serious distortions in the
private sector of the economy.  Section 5 reviews the impact of tax systems  on the investment
climate in transition economies.  Section 6 contains a brief review of outstanding issues in the
reform of tax administration.  Section 7 considers  foreign direct investment.  Section 8
concludes by bringing  together the questions raised by the analysis of the paper and put to its
commentators to stimulate discussion at the conference.4
2. PUBLIC EXPENDITURE  IN THE TRANSITION  COUNTRIES
The purpose of taxation is to raise resources to finance government expenditures  on
key public goods (such as a stable macroeconomic environment  and legal and judicial
systems to secure property rights) and the provision of basic social services. Taxation and
expenditures  should ideally be analyzed together.
Figure 4: Public Expenditures and Income Level Per Capita, 2000
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CSB refers to Central and  Southeastern  Europe and the Baltics and includes: Albania,  Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,  Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia,  Poland, Romania, the Slovak Republic and
Slovania
CIS refers  to the Commonwealth of Independent States and includes:  Armenia, Azerbaijan,  Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyz Republic,  Moldova,  Russian Federation,  Tajikistan, Turkmenistan,  Ulcraine  and Uzbekistan.
Figure 4, reproduced from Alam and Sundberg (2002), plots countries'  shares of
government expenditure in GDP against the log of their per capita income (adjusted for
purchasing power parity) across a sample of developed and developing countries  for which
comparable  fiscal data were available  in 2000. The figure allows the following two points to
be made.5
•  The magnitude of expenditure  adjustment during the 1  990s was much greater in the
CIS countries.  Starting from levels of 50 percent or more in the pre-transition  years
[Tanzi (1991)]  and between 45 to 50 percent in 1992, the latter comparable to those in
the industrial countries, the share of government expenditure in the CIS countries,
fell to levels comparable to those in countries at similar per capita income levels. In
contrast, the share of government  expenditure in the CSB countries was almost a third
higher than that indicated by the figure for countries  at similar per capita income
levels. This does not necessarily imply, pending further analysis, that public spending
in the CSB countries is excessive,  since the size of government here,  as elsewhere,  is
shaped, inter alia  by both views about the role of the state and the costs of the tax
systems needed to support public expenditures  at different levels.
*  The size of government rises with level of income per capita.  Public  expenditure as a
proportion of GDP is on average 29 percent in the CIS countries,  a group of countries
with a PPP-based per capita GDP of $3,850 that have made limited progress with
transition to a market economy, compared with just under 41  percent in the CSB
countries,  a group of countries with a PPP-based per capita GDP of $9,350 that are
further advanced  in the transition. These may be compared with an average of  42
percent in the high-income OECD countries2 3.
However,  it should be noted that these numbers do not include spending that was moved out
of the budgetary arena in the form of implicit and contingent liabilities which softened
2 Simple averages  are used to arrive at figures  for country groups
3The high income OECD countries include Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,  Demnark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece,  Iceland, Ireland,  Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand,  Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,  Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and the United States of America.6
budget constraints4. But these do not affect the thrust of the conclusions about tax systems
drawn in this paper.
Table  1 displays the functional structure of public expenditure both as a share of GDP
and as a share of total public expenditure  in these groups of countries: the high income
OECD, the CSB and the CIS countries.
4 Examples are provided  in World Bank (2000a)Table 1 Functional Structure of Public  Expenditures: Country Groups
(1999-2000 average;  in percent of GDP)'
Economic Affairs and Services
GDP per  Total  General  Defense  Public Order  Educaton  Health  Social  Housing &  Recreabional,  Fuel  Agnculture,  Mining, Manufactunng,  Transportabon  Other  Interest  Other
capita in  2000  Expenditure
5 Public  &  Safety  Security &  Community  Cultural, & &  Forestry,  &  Construcbon  &  Economic  Expenditures
(PPP USS)  Service  Welfare  Amenites  Religrous  Energy  Fishing, &  Communicaton  Affairs &
Affairs  Huntng  Services
High-Incomre
OECD
2 26,200  424  2.9  16  1.2  53  54  156  15  08  02  0.8  03  2.2  1.0  46  -09
CSB  9,300  41.9  2  9  1  9  2  3  4.8  5.2  14 0  1  8  1.0  0 2  1  2  0  3  2  3  1  2  2.7  0 0
CIS,  3,850  291  18  1.7  15  43  22  78  13  06  05  15  06  1.5  05  19  1.3
Functional Structure of Public Expenditures:  Country Groups
(1999-2000  average; In percent  of  total expenditures)'
Economic Affairs and Services
GDP  per  Total  General  Defense  Public Order & Education  Health  Social  Housing &  Recreatonal,  Fuel  Agnculture,  Mintng, Manufacunring,  Transportabon  Other  Interest  Other
capita in 2000  Expenditures  Publc  Safety  Security &  CommuntyA  Cultural, &  &  Forestry,  &  Constructon  &  Economic  Expenditures
(PPP USS)  Service  Welfare  menites  Religrous  Energy  Fshing, &  Communicabon  Affairs &
Affairs  Huntng  Services




3 9,300  1000  70  45  55  116  12.3  333  42  24  05  2.9  07  56  28  68  01
CIS'  3,850  1000  6.3  57  51  149  76  269  45  2.2  18  53  22  51  16  64  45
1  Consolidated  budgetary, extrabudgetary and social secunty accounts of central, statelprovincial and local govemments  For Hih-lncome OECD countres years of  observabons  vary
2 Austna, Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland, France, Gemiany, Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands,  Portugal,  Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,  Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Swrtzerland,  Unrted States
3Albania, Bosnia,  Bulgaria,  Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia,  Hungary, Latvia,  Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak Republic, Slovenla, Yugoslavia. For purposes of expendIture, the CSB exdudes Macedona where a  comparable
disaggregabon rnto functons was  not avaabble  and indude Yugoslavia, for which the data pertains to 2001
'Armenia,  Azerbaijan,  Belarus, Georgia,  Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russian Federation, Tajiktstan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine,  Uzbekistan
5Excluding  grants and transfers between budgets of different levels
Source  GFS,  IMF sfaff reports8
Social security and welfare account for over a third of public expenditure in the high income
OECD and CSB countries and for roughly a quarter of public expenditures  in the CIS
countries.  Public expenditures on health and education  make up a quarter of public
expenditure in the high income OECD and CSB countries and a little under 22 percent in the
CIS countries. They are split roughly evenly between health and education in the OECD and
EU accession  countries  , but health expenditures  are around twice as much as those for
education  in the CIS countries. Altogether expenditures  on education, health and social
protection account for nearly 60 percent of public expenditures  in the high income OECD
and CSB countries and nearly a half in the CIS countries.  It will be recollected however that
both GDP and the share of public expenditures  in GDP are significantly lower in the CIS
countries,  so that public expenditures on education  and health, for example, have each fallen
to $10 per capita or less in the poorest CIS countries such as the Kyrgyz Republic and
Tajikistan.
3. TAX SYSTEMS IN TRANSITION
What are the characteristics  of the tax systems which raise resources to finance those
public expenditures?  This section sets tax systems in transition countries  in comparative
international perspective.
Cross sectional comparisons
We begin by comparing  features of the tax systems in the CIS countries with those in the
CSB countries and the high income OECD  countries.  The stylized facts emerging from9
such a comparison at the end of the first decade of transition,  1999-2000,  are as follows (see
Table 2, Figure 5 and, for country details, Appendix tables  1-6).
*  The share of tax revenue in GDP rises from 22 percent in the CIS countries through
33 percent in the CSB countries to 37 percent  in the high income OECD countries.
*  The share of direct taxes, viz.,  personal and corporate income taxes  plus social
security contributions-cum-payroll  taxes, in total tax revenue rises from 43 percent in
the CIS countries through 54 percent in the CSB countries to 63 percent in the high
income OECD countries.  While the share of personal income taxes  in total tax
revenue increases,  that of corporate income taxes falls sharply reflecting in part the
integration of personal and corporate taxes, with collection at the corporate level
counting as advance payment for the personal income tax.  It should also be noted
that the share of social security contributions-cum-payroll  taxes in total tax revenue is
significantly higher in the CSB countries at the end of the decade compared, not only
to the high income OECD countries but also to the European Union where,  social
security contributions are higher than in the non-EU countries of the high income
5 OECD group5.
5  It may be noted that social security in the USA generally refers  only to pensions  whereas social secunty in
Europe covers the area called social protection in the USA.10
Table 2. Tax Structure of Industrial  and Transition Countries
(in percent of GDP)
Total  Tax  Other  Taxes on Income, Profits, and  Social  Domestic Taxes on  Intemational  Trade  Wealth  Othe
Revenue  Revenue  Revenue  Capital Gains  Security  Goods &  Services  of  Taxes  &  Tax
&  &  &  which  Property  Revent
Grants  Grants  Of which  Payroll  General  sales, tumover  Of which  Taxes
Total  Individual  Corporate  tax  Total  VAT  Excises  Total  Import  Export
_______I  duties  duties
High  42.9  36 6  63  14.4  10.1  26  8.9  10 7  6.1  3.1  0.1  0 1  0.0  1 8  0.7
income
OECD
European  45 2  39.4  5 8  14.3  9 6  2 6  10.8  11.9  6.7  3.7  0.0  0.0  0.0  1.5  0 9
Union  2  _
CSB  40.8  35.0  5 8  9 7  5.3  4 3  11.2  11.0  8.4  2.2  2.0  2.0  00  0 3  0 8
(early
transition)  _  _
CSB (late  37.7  33 0  4.7  7.4  5.2  2  1  10 6  12.4  8 7  3 4  1.3  1.3  0.0  0 4  0.7
transition)  II___
CIS  . 29.3  24.4  4 9  8.0  1.7  6 2  6.2  9 0  6.2  2 5  0.7  0.5  0.1  0.2  0 3
(early
transition)  _  _
CIS(late  25.5  222  32  53  20  3 1  45  97  6 1  2.5  1.2  1.1  0 1  08  06
transition)  I  I  I.  - _
Tax Structure of Industrial and Transition  Countries  l
(in percent of tax revenues)
Total  Tax  Other  Taxes on  Income, Profits, and  Social  Domestic Taxes on  International Trade  Wealth  Otht
Revenue  Revenue  Revenue  Capital Gains  Secunty  Goods &  Services. of  Taxes  &  Tax
&  &  &  which  Property  Reven
Grants  Grants  Of which  Payroll  General sales, turnover  Of which  Taxes
Total  Individual  Corporate  tax  Total  VAT  Excises  Total  Import  Export
_________  _______  I  duties  duties
High  117.4  100 0  17.4  39.6  28 2  7.6  23.3  29 6  16.8  89  0 5  0.4  0.0  5.3  1 8
income
OECD  I  I_I
European  114.9  1000  14.9  36.0  24.2  70  266  31.3  17.8  10.0  0.0  0.0  00  3.9  22
Union 2
CSB  1177  1000  177  27.5  14.7  12.6  31.5  31.7  24.0  6.5  62  62  0.0  07  24
(early
transition)  I  I 
CSB(late  114.9  1000  14.9  225  15.6  65  31.6  37.9  26.6  10.3  43  4.3  00  1.3  2.4
transition)  I  l  I
CIS  126.8  100.0  26.8  33.1  7.7  24.6  23.9  37.0  28.1  9.7  3 2  2.4  03  0.8  2.1
(early
transition)  __  _  _  __  _  _  _
CIS  (late  1153  100.0  15 3  23.9  9.8  12.6  19.4  44.0  31  0  11  6  5.9  5.4  04  3.3  3.4
transitionL  __  __  _  I__  _  _  __  _  _  _  __  _  _I__  _  _  _  _  I___  _  __  _  _  __  _  _  _  _  _  _
i Consolidated General  Govermnent unless indicated otherwise.  For those latter indications, see Appendix Tables 1 to 6
2 Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,  Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg,  Netherlands, Portugal,  Spain,
Sweden, United KingdomI1
Figure 5
Tax Revenues in High Income OECDand  Transition Economies
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o  The share of domestic  indirect taxes, viz., VAT/sales/turnover  taxes and excises in
total tax revenue decreases from 44 percent in the CIS countries through 38 percent in
the CSB countries to 30 percent in the industrial countries.  With the share of excises
remaining broadly unchanged,  this reflects  a decline in VAT/sales/turnover  taxes.
o  Trade taxes  are relatively unimportant in transition countries  and their contribution to
tax revenue  is negligible in the industrial countries.
Comparisons  over time
The stylized facts presented above, involving a comparison both in levels and in
composition of tax systems in the CIS, CSB and industrial countries from the lowest to the
highest levels of GDP per capita, are broadly similar to those observed in comparisons  of
developing with industrial countries.6 However,  in understanding why tax systems in
transition countries  look the way they do now, it is also necessary to compare the evolution
of tax structures of the CIS countries as well as those of the CSB countries  from the early
years of transition to those prevailing at the end of its first decade.  The stylized facts
emerging from this comparison may be summarized as follows (see Table 2, Figure 5 and for
country details, Appendix tables  1-6)
o  The share of tax revenue to GDPfell from 24 percent to 22 percent in the CIS
countries and from 35 percent to 33  percent in the CSB countries between  the
beginning and end of the 1990s,  paralleling the reduction in public expenditures  noted
6 Burgess and Stem (1993)13
in Section 2.  This left the CSB countries and, a fortiori  the CIS countries in 1999-
2000 with a lower tax revenue to GDP ratio than the 37 percent prevailing in the high
income OECD countries.
*  The share of direct taxes, viz., personal  and corporate income taxes plus social
security contributions-cum-payroll  taxes, to total tax revenue  fell from 56 percent to
43 percent in the CIS countries and from 59 percent to 54 percent  in the CSB
countries.  This left the transition countries with a share of direct taxes in total tax
revenue in 1999-2000  much lower than the 63 percent obtaining in industrial
countries.  The decline was primarily due to a sharp  fall in the share of the corporate
income tax-from 25 percent to 13 percent in the CIS countries and  13 percent to 7
percent  in the CSB countries-and reflected the elimination of a captive source of
revenue,  viz. taxes on profits of publicly owned enterprises.  This more than offset an
increase in the share of the individual income tax in total tax revenue in both groups
of transition countries.  The share of social security contributions-cum-payroll  taxes
to total tax revenuefell in the CIS countries to levels below that in the high income
OECD economies but remained broadly unchanged  in the CSB countries.
*  The decline in the share of direct taxes  is reflected  in movements in the share of
domestic  indirect taxes, viz., VAT/sales/turnover  taxes plus excises, which rose from
37 percent to 44 percent in the CIS countries and from 32 percent to 38 percent in the
CSB countries. There was an increase in the share of both VAT/sales/turnover  taxes
as well as excises.  This left the CIS and, a fortiori  the CSB countries in 1999-2000
with shares of domestic indirect taxation to GDP higher than the corresponding  share14
of 30 percent in the industrial countries.  Moreover, this observation applied equally
to the shares of both VAT/sales/tumover taxes and excises in total tax revenue.
Granhing the tax transition
A visual perspective on how the composition of tax revenue varies between high income
OECD, CSB and CIS countries in cross section and over time is provided, following Burgess
and Stem (1993), by Figure 6.  With trade taxes accounting for a very low proportion of total
tax revenue,  the figure focuses on the shares of income tax, social security contributions-
cum-payroll taxes and domestic indirect taxes in non-trade tax revenue (total tax revenues
less trade tax revenue).  The points A, B, and C in the triangle represent  100 percent of (non-
trade) tax revenue from personal and corporate  income taxes,  100 percent from social
security contributions cum-payroll  taxes and 100 percent from domestic  indirect taxes
respectively.  A point on the line BC corresponds  to a zero level of income taxes, while a
point on the line AC corresponds to a zero level of social security contributions-cum-payroll
taxes and a point on the line AB corresponds to a zero level of domestic indirect taxes. Figure
6, where the three points show unweighted averages for the high income OECD, CSB and
CIS country groups, allows the following points to be made.Figure 6: Breakdown of Non-trade Tax Revenue  by Type: High Income OECD, CSB,
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The high income OECD countries are on average  closer to the income tax corner and
towards the axis AB compared to the transition countries.  The CIS countries are on average
closer to the domestic indirect tax corner and towards the axis AC compared to the industrial
and CSB countries.  The CSB countries are closer to the social security contribution - cum-
payroll tax corner and towards the axis BC compared to the CIS countries.  Figure 7 shows
the scatter for the countries in each group.16
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o  More than 95 percent of industrial  countries derive  30 percent or more of (non-trade)
tax revenue from income taxes, while more than 75 percent of transition countries
derive less than 30 percent of tax revenue from income taxes.
O  More than 80 percent of CIS countries derive 40 percent or more of (non-trade) tax
revenue  from domestic indirect taxes, while more than 80 percent of industrial
countries derive less than 40 percent of tax revenue from domestic indirect taxes.
o  More than 75 percent of CSB countries derive 30 percent or more of (non-trade)  tax
revenue from social security and payroll taxes, while more than 80 percent of CIS17
countries derive less than 30 percent of tax revenue from social security and payroll
taxes.
Figures 8 through  11  compare the characteristics of tax system in the CSB and CIS
countries as between the early years of transition  and the end of its first decade. Figures  8 and
9 show that, on average the CSB and CIS countries in 1999-2000 were further away from the
income tax corner and closer to the domestic indirect tax corner than they were in early
transition. This was a move away from the composition found in high income OECD
countries.  While the share of social  security contributions- cum-payroll taxes (non-trade)  tax
revenue remained broadly unchanged  in the CSB,  so that the points representing the CSB
countries in early transition and  1999-2000 are equally far away from the AC axis, the CIS
countries moved away from the social security contributions-cum-payroll  tax  corner during
the first decade of transition.Figure  8:  Breakdown of Tax Revenue  by Type:  Hign  lincome  OECD and CSB  E-conomies
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Figures  10 and 11  show the scatter for the individual countries.
o  More than 50 percent of the CSB countries and more than 80 percent of the CIS
countries  in early transition derived 30 percent or more of (non-trade) tax revenue
from income taxes, while more than 90 percent of the CSB countries and nearly 60
percent of the CIS countries in 1999-2000  derived less than 30 percent of non-trade
tax revenue from income taxes.
o  More than 75 percent of the CSB countries and more than 55 percent of the CIS
countries  in early transition derived 40 percent or less of (non-trade) tax revenue from
domestic  indirect taxes, while more than 60 percent of the CSB countries and more
than 80 percent of the CIS countries in  1999-2000 derived 40 percent or more of
(non-trade) tax revenue from domestic indirect taxes.
What happened  and why ?
The results of these comparisons,  in cross-section between the CIS, CSB and the high
income OECD countries,  and for two time periods between the CSB and itself as well as the
CIS and itself, illustrate the challenges that transition countries have faced in developing a
tax system appropriate for a market economy.  The opposing movements in key ratios
describing levels and composition of taxes (i) between the onset of transition and the end of
its first decade in the transition countries and (ii) in cross-section compared to the industrial
countries  at end-decade suggest that the evolution of tax systems in transition countries is
"U-shaped",  with regard both to the share of tax revenue to GDP as well as the shares of21
major taxes in tax revenue.  The comparison across the same subgroups of transition
countries between the onset of transition and the end of its first decade, inter alia, reflect two
sets of developments.  First, the loss of traditional profit, turnover and payroll tax revenues
from erstwhile captive State enterprises rendered uncompetitive by price liberalization and
either downsized  by hardening budget constraints  or kept afloat by tax exemptions and a
tolerance of tax and other arrears.  And, second, the inability to institute quickly a well-
administered  tax system covering a broad base with low rates which would encourage tax
compliance  among new and restructured enterprises rather than driving them underground.
Both considerations  illustrate a key aspect of transition, viz. a movement from a system,
where the government exercised a preemptive claim on output and income before citizens
had access to the remainder to one with a greatly diminished role for the public sector, where
the government needs to collect revenue in order to spend.  These developments led to
*  a fall in the tax revenue-to-GDP  ratio, a significant part of which was accounted
for by a decline in revenue from the corporate  income tax, the latter arising from
the loss of revenue from profits of publicly-owned enterprises;
*  a fall in the public expenditures to GDP ratio caused by the need to reduce fiscal
deficits  in order to stabilize  inflation;
*  a decline in the importance of income taxes, mainly accounted for by the fall in
the share of corporate  income taxes;
*  a decline in the importance of social security contributions-cum-payroll  taxes in
the CIS countries;22
o  a rise in the share of individual income taxes;  and
o  a sharp increase in the importance of domestic indirect taxes in tax revenue-both
VAT/sales/turnover  taxes and excises-  reflecting in part the decline in  the role
of direct taxes.
What needs to be done
The cross-sectional  and intertemporal  comparisons between the CIS, the CSB and the
high income OECD countries show,  that viewed from the perspective of taxation, outcomes
associated with an unraveling of the command economy in the early transition and those that
occurred subsequently were different, the latter being analogous to those seen in the
development of poor countries. With the exception of the increase in the importance  of
personal income taxation, the former set of developments needs to be reversed in order to
move towards a market economy.  However, this needs to be done, not by reclaiming the
traditional bases and instruments of central planning but instead by accessing bases in the
emerging private sector not under direct state control and using the apparatus of a modem tax
system, viz., a personal income tax, a corporate income tax with deductions for the costs of
generating those incomes, social security contributions  and payroll taxes, a value added tax
levied on consumption,  excises on items such as tobacco, alcoholic beverages  and petroleum
and low customs tariffs and implemented by a rule-based tax administration.  The
developments  to be brought about through tax reform are
o  a rise in the share of tax revenue to GDP;
o  an increase  in the share of direct taxes in tax revenue;23
*  a continuing rise in the share of revenue from personal income taxes;
*  a decline in the share of revenue from domestic indirect taxes; and
*  a decline in the contribution of trade taxes to revenue to negligible levels.
4.  BENCHMARK  LEVELS AND COMPOSITION  OF TAX REVENUE
Could the current levels of public expenditure  in the transition countries arrived at in
part through socio-political  as well as economic judgments about the role of the state, be
financed by these taxes without creating significant distortions in the private sector?
The following considerations are relevant in answering this question.
*  The value added tax, a very successful innovation in tax practice, raises on
average around 7 percent of GDP in the high income OECD countries.  Empirical
evidence based on those countries suggests that in all countries where the VAT
collects more than 7 percent of GDP, there is a clear tradeoff between a higher tax
rate and a broader tax base.  Countries facing such a tradeoff have rates of 14
percent to 22 percent on bases between 60 percent and 40 percent of GDP.  The
evidence also suggests that the longer a VAT has been in place, allowing
taxpayers  and administrators more time for improved compliance  and
enforcement,  the higher is the rate of compliance  with the tax.7 It therefore
seems reasonable to suppose that transition countries, which have limited
experience with the VAT, could not, for the next few years,  expect to raise more
than around  6 to 7 percent of GDP, depending on the quality of their tax
7  Agha and Haughton (1996), IMF (2001)24
administration,  without encountering problems with compliance or introducing
significant distortions into their economies.  The other major item of indirect
taxation,  viz., excises, which are generally levied on alcohol, tobacco  and
petroleum, can be expected to yield around 2 to 3 percent or so of GDP.  Given
that these products are associated with 5% or so of total expenditure,  this implies
high rates of taxation.  With trade taxes becoming less important, the share of
indirect taxes in GDP can thus be expected to yield roughly 8 to  10 percent of
GDP.
*  Income taxes as a share of GDP,  average around 15 percent of GDP in the high
income OECD countries.  Within the category of income taxes, personal taxes are
usually about three to four times as important as corporate taxes in the industrial
countries.  Corporate taxes typically account for between 2 and 3 percent of GDP,
partly reflecting  the fact that, with a well-functioning tax administration,  there is
less need to use income taxes on  corporations  as a withholding device for
collecting personal  income taxes.  Furthermore,  a high corporate income tax rate
has the potential  for discouraging investrnent in a world where capital is very
mobile across national boundaries.  The base for income taxation is assumed to be
roughly half of non-agricultural  income. The latter as a share of GDP ranges from
below 50 percent in Albania to over 90 percent in the Central European  countries
depending on the country's per capita income level, yielding a range of 25 percent
to 45 percent for the tax base. With average rates of income tax in the range of 20
to 25 percent,  and taking into account tradeoffs between a higher tax rate and a
broader tax base, it may then be expected that the income tax could eventually
raise between 6 and 9 percent of GDP depending on a country's per capita25
income, with the relative  share of personal taxes compared to corporate taxes
increasing with the level of economic development and the quality of the tax
administration.
*  Social security contributions and payroll taxes as a share of GDP average  11
percent in the EU accession CSB countries which, despite the significantly lower
per capita income in these countries, is comparable to the share prevailing in the
European Union.  This reflects  in part their socialist legacy, and, in part, the
successful  use of social  expenditures to cushion the impact on the poor of
downsizing in the early years of transitions.  In fact, payroll  taxes in the EU
accession  countries range from 33 percent in Estonia to 50 percent in Slovakia,
while Italy, Spain and Sweden have rates  about 30 percent and in no case higher
than 40 percent.9 Evidence from a recent empirical  analysis of Slovakia, where
the unemployment rate averaged  19 percent in 2001, suggests that while the
unemployment  insurance, social assistance  and social  support schemes have been
effective in alleviating poverty, they have  exerted significant  disincentive effects
on labor supply.  Reforms of the benefit program designed to "make  employment
pay" rather than penalizing unemployment,  have the potential to reduce double
digit unemployment  and lower social spending, thereby making possible an
eventual  reduction in payroll taxes'°.  This is also broadly consistent with the
findings from other OECD countries and argues  for reforms in social expenditures
and a reduction of the distortions  arising from payroll taxes.  The situation is,
however, quite different in the CIS countries where social security contributions
8  For a further discussion of this point, see World Bank (2000)
9  Riboud,  Sanchez and Silva (2002)
1° The analysis  is reported  in  World Bank (2001)26
on average account for less than 5 percent of GDP.  Turning to the role of these
taxes in an overall revenue package, with the wage bill in the formal sector of the
economy as a share of GDP ranging from 20 percent to 50 percent or more across
countries of the region, and taking into account tradeoffs  between  a higher tax
rate and a broader tax base, a payroll tax rate averaging 20 percent to 30 percent
could yield between 6 percent  and 10 percent of GDP.
Table 3: Benchmark Levels and Composition of Tax Revenue
Base, % of  Rate  Yield, % of
GDP  GDP
VAT  40%-60%  12%-22%  6%-7%
Income tax  25%-45%  20%-25%  6%-9%
Social Security contribution  cum payroll tax  20%-50%  20%-30%  6%-10%
Subtotal  18%-26%
Excises (tobacco, alcohol, petroleum)  2%-3%
Other taxes (trade, property, etc.)  2%
Total tax revenue  22%-31%
Adjusted downward by one percentage point from 7%-8%  for inexperience with the tax
On the basis of these broad efficiency considerations  and consistency with
comparative  evidence on public expenditure shares for countries  at comparable income
levels, it is suggested that the transition countries,  depending on their stage of development,
aim for a tax revenue-to-GDP  ratio in the range of 22 to 31 percent or so, comprising VAT (6
to 7 percent), excises (2 to 3 percent),  income tax (6 to 9 percent), social security
contribution-cum-payroll  tax  (6 to  10 percent), and other taxes such as on trade and on
property (2 percent)".
o  While the upper end of this suggested range is lower than the 33 percent of GDP that
tax revenue represented in the CSB countries in 1999-2000,  it is close enough to the
l  A similar analysis for China is presented in Hussein and Stern (1993)27
expenditure to GDP ratio of 33 percent, typical of countries  at comparable per capita
income levels, to be financeable  with non tax revenue sources,  which usually account
for roughly 2 to 3 percent of GDP.  In any event, most EU accession  countries, as part
of their 2000-2004 Pre-Accession  Economic Program, are aiming to cut taxes on the
order of 2 percent of GDP and incur incremental  expenditures on the order of 3.5
percent of GDP to comply with the requirements of the EU's acquis  communautaire,
while at the same time improving budget balance by around 0.5 percent of GDP'2.
These ambitious goals can only be accomplished through a sharp reduction  in the
share of regular public expenditures  to GDP, together with a tight prioritization
within that envelope, which requires  a thorough going reappraisal of the role of the
state in the economy.
The lower end of the 22 to 31 percent range for tax revenue to GDP  is  equal to the
average for the CIS countries.  However,  the average tax revenue to GDP ratio for the
low income  CIS countries which face the most acute development challenges
(Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia,  the Kyrgyz Republic,  Moldova, Tajikistan and
Uzbekistan)  is only 18 percent. Raising this share in order to finance public
expenditures,  especially in the social sectors,  where they have fallen to extremely  low
levels  in those countries (for example,  on education  $4 per capita in Tajikistan,  $9 per
capita in the Kyrgyz Republic  and $11  per capita in Armenia in 1999, compared to
$180 per capita in the EU accession countries, and on health $1 per capita  in
Tajikistan and $7 per capita in the Kyrgyz Republic and Georgia in 1999, compared
to $176 per capita in the EU accession countries) together with appropriate
prioritization  of those expenditures,  is an important policy priority.
12 Funck (2002)28
This motivates our first question for the commentators:
o  What is the level  and composition of tax revenue that raises enough resources to
flnance public expenditures without introducing excessive  distortions in the
private sector?  IEs tax revenue as a share of GDP1  "too  high" in the CSB countries
and "too low" in the CItS countries?
5. TAXATION AND THE INVESTMENT  CLIMATE
As noted earlier, small enterprises employing fewer than 50 workers, many of them
de novo but also some firms spun off from state enterprises,  have been key to generating
employment and creating wealth in transition economies.  A major policy-cum-institutional
challenge  facing governments across the region has been the creation of an attractive and
competitive investment climate in which restructured and new enterprises have incentives to
absorb labor and assets, rendered inexpensive by the downsizing of old and unviable
enterprises,  and invest in expansion.  This challenge includes reducing excessively high
marginal  tax rates, simplifying regulatory procedures, establishing security of property rights,
and providing basic infrastructure,  while maintaining  a level playing field among old,
restructured and new enterprises.
The Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, covering  a large
number of enterprises  in over 20 transition economies, and conducted jointly by the
European  Bank for Reconstruction  and Development and the World Bank in  1999,29
unbundled factors influencing the investment climate into microeconomic variables
(including taxes and regulations),  macroeconomic  variables (including policy instability,
inflation and exchange rates) and law and order (including functioning of the judiciary,
corruption, street crime, disorder, organizational  crime, and mafia)'3. According to the
respondents, taxes and regulations were consistently among the most important impediments
to expansion by new enterprises.
Table 4 reports the number of taxes and the average  rates that are  imposed on
businesses14. The number of national taxes-profit  tax, VAT/sales tax, income tax and social
security taxes (in the form of payroll taxes, the latter here consisted as one tax), together with
turnover taxes to support various special  funds -which  is shown in column 5 of the table, is
a rough indicator of the complexity of the tax system'5. On this measure,  Poland and
Hungary have the least complex national tax systems, as contrasted with Belarus,
Turkmenistan  and Uzbekistan.  However, the last four  columns  of Table 4  also report the
extent to which countries  attempt to relieve the burden on small firms through tax breaks or
simplified arrangements  16  17
Whatever the merits of rules and legislation,  the arbitrary bureaucratic harassment to
which the administration of taxes and business licensing gives rise continues to be a
significant problem. For example,  a survey of some 2000 predominantly small and medium
13 For details, see EBRD(1999)
14 We thank Kjetil Tvedt for producing Table 4, which updates Table  8.3 in EBRD (1999). Definitions  on SMEs
and micro businesses are those used in national tax codes.
Is Column (4) of the table also reports the maximum rate of personal income tax since businesses registered  as
sole proprietors and often subject to personal income tax.
16 The column for 'tax incentive  for new start-ups/investments'  emphasizes tax breaks either in favor or disfavor
of SMEs. Incentives disfavoring  SMEs would be all incentives promoting large investments.  Tax breaks  for
FDIs are interpreted  in disfavor of SMEs, based on the assumption that foreign investors normally faces some
initial obstacles in form of administrative problems or lack of information, which are in the nature of fixed costs
and which play a more significant role for small start-ups firms.
17  General SME tax break is here to be understood  as cases when SMEs face a discount in the profit tax because
of their size.  Simplified tax in form of a gross turnover tax or lump sum tax may cause a reduced tax burden as
well.  However,  the information  is not clear on the tax burden following simplified arrangements,  and such
procedures  are never interpreted  as an SME tax discount.30
enterprises  (with a mean firm size of 22 workers and a median firm size of 10 workers) done
in Russia in March-April  2002  by the Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)
and the World Bank found that in 2001, between  5 and 21 percent of those who had been in
business before and after the passing of legislation designed to improve the investment
climate, were visited between 2 and 3 times each by sanitary, police and fire safety
Is inspectors, which is in excess of that prescribed by the law  .
la CEFIR and World Bank (2002)Table 4.  SME Taxation
Country  GENERAL  TAXATION  TAXATION  RELATED  TO SMES
Standard  Standard  Max  Number of  VAT tumover  tax incentives for new  General  Simpiified tax for SMEs and
profit tax  VAT  personal  national  threshold (US$)  start-ups/investments  SME tax  sole
Income tax  taxes  break  propnetors (lump  sum or
presumptive)
Favounng  Favouring large
SMEs  firms
Albania  25%  20%  25%  5  57000  No  No  No  Lump  sum or gross turnover
Armenia  20%  20%  20%  4  17200  No  Yes"  No  Lump  sum"'l
Azerbaijan  27%  18%  35%  4  6400  No  No  No  gross tumover taxoe
Belarus  30%  20%  30%  8v  6000  No  No  Yes  Lump sum
Bosnia & Herzegovina  30%  24%  sales  50%  4  No  No  Yes v,"'  No  No
(Federation)  tax  I
Bosnia &  Herzegovina  20%-10%  18%  sales  25%  5  No  No  Yes'  No  No
(Rep)  (regressive  tax  I
Bulgaria  23,5%  20%  29%  4  33000  No  No  Yes"  Lump sum"'
Croatia  20%  22%  35%  4  6000  No  Yes  No  LumP sum
Czech  Republic  31  %  22%  32%  4  91000  No  Yes""'  No  Lump  sum
Estonia  26%  18%  26%  4  No  No  No  No  No
Georgia  20%  20%  20%  5  11000  No  No  No  Lump sum""v
Hungary  18%  25%  40%  4  No  Yes27  No  No  No
Kazakhstan  30%  16%  30%  4  25000  No  No  No  Lump sum or gross tumover
Kosovo  20°/a  15%  20%  4  92000  No  No  No  gross tumover tax E
Kyrgyzstan  20%  20%  20%  6  2100  No  No  No  gross tumover tax
Latvia  22%  18%  25%  4  16000  No  Yes ml'  Yes"_  _  _  No
Lithuania  15%  18%  33%  4  2600  No  No  Yes""  Presumptive tax
(FYR)  Macedonia  15%  19%  18%  4  76000  No  Yes"'  No  Lump sum
Moldova  25%  20%  35%  4  No  Yes"""'  Yes  ""v  No  Lump sum"xx
Poland  28%  22%  40%  4  9000  No  No  No  Lump sum
Romania  25%  19%  40%  6  1500  Yes x  Yes"""  No  Gross turnover tax  """
Russia  20-24%  20%  13%  5(4 from  No  No  No  No  mx  Gross turnover tax
20031
Slovak Republic  25°/a  23%  38%  4  16000  No  Yes'  No  Lump sum
Slovenia  25%  20%  50%  4  20000  No  No  No  No
Tajikistan  30%  20%  20%  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N.A.  N  A.  N.A.
Turkmenistan  25%  20%  25%  6  Small-scale firms  No  Yes"-x'  Yes  '  Lump  sum"""'"
exempt.  .v
Ukraine  30%  20%  40%  5  11500  No  No  No  Gross tumover tax
Uzbekistan  26%  20%  36%  6  Small firms are  No  Yes  """  No  Gross tumover tax or lump
-exempt  sum____
FRY Montenegro  20%  8-17% Sale  40%  4  No  N A  N.A  N.A.  N A.
_ _  _ _ _  _ _  _ _ _  _  _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _  ~ta  x  _  _  _  _  _ _  _  _  _  _  _
FRY Serbia  20%  20O/r  sale  20%4  No  W  s  '  No  No  No
tax
'Lump  sum for micro  businesses  annual tumover under 2  million  leks (US$14000),
4%  gross  tumover tax for small businesses =  annual tumover 2-8 miflion leks (US$57000)32
PFLD r ADM 500 million (US$ 860,000)
a Fixed  payment for small scale activites such as hairdressers, gas stations  commercial fishing, and  aWing acivities conducted in  locals wit trading area  ess fthan 30 square meters. Azerbailan ~ 2%  gross tumover tax when  tumover tess than 300 times the mnimum tax-exempted wage (US$  6400). Belani
In  addition  to the standard 4,  there is Road tax, Chemobyt  fund, Public housing fund, and R&D fund. 50% discount on pmft  tax for smalD  enterprises = profit iess than 5,000 MMW  (5000YR3600=US$10,000) and having number of staff as mentioned below; for industnes -less than 200 people; in  science and scintifc servces -less than 100 people. for construction and other productive sectors up to 50 people: for non-productive sectors up to 25 people. s  Lump sum tax for stores  that are single owned  and total trading space less than  25 square meters,  plus public catering enterprses,  and at markets  and sals exhibibons. Bosnia &  Hemaorovrna (Federation)
profit generated by foreign capital Bosnia A Herzeoiaa (eJub
I profit generated by foreign  capial
Bubada
'20%  profit tax for small businesses defined  by taxable  promfd  ess  than BGN  50,000 (US$22,200)
n for sole traders.
Croatia
1f  Newly established companies quaiify for reduoed tax rates and the reducion is  higher for targer investments.
Czech Reoubli
for mv  Over CZK 350 million (US$  10 million)
Geogia
wfor enterprises with  turmover less than GEL 24,000 (US$  1,000)
Hungary
I SMEs can wrdte off  ts  tax by interest on loan used for investrnent In  assets.
Koswovo
" 3%  gross tumover tax for SMEs - tumover under 200,000 DEM (US$ 92,000)
Kvyrastan
ISMEs(total revenue up to 3  million sorrs or approximately  US63 000) may pay Irom 5  to1O%  gross turnover tax instead of eli natonal taxes above (apparentiy  SMEs find this system unfavourabte and rather use the general system). Individual entrepreneurs can optionally get a  patent and pay a monthly  gross tumover tax, i.e.  in retaiD  trade - 4%
Latva
5  For inv. over US$  16 milton.
d 20% profd tax for SMEs meeting at least two of the following three conddions: book value of tangible assets - 70000  tats (EUR  123 700);net tumover- 200 000  ats (EUR  353 400);average number of  employees - 25 parsons.
13%  profit tax for small businesses with less than 11 employees and a  gross annual Incomb  less than LTL 500,000 (US$ 130000).
- Optonal for fimis with  gross income less fthan  100,000 LTL (US$  26,000)
Maeoia  (FYR)
tax holiday for tax generated by foreign capital
I  SMEs  rmy benefit  from a  35% discount on proft  tax for tto years
50% tax discount given the first five years if  foregn investments exceeds  US$ 250,000
Individual entrepreneurs can buy patent which involve a monthly fee.
RomWn&a
for reinvested  profit
Z for large FDI
micro enterprises  with  ess than 10 employees and an annual tumover bess than Euro  100,000
Planned frm 2003; Small enterpnses with  annual tumoverof  10 million roubbes  (US$320,000) and up to 20 employees will be entted to choose between 8%  tumover tax or 20%  profit tax (standard  24%).
5  years tax holiday for FDI over EUR 5  mfilion
I1rmenistan
Tax breaks subect to negotiatons. It  is  assumed that large fims have more  negotiabon power. I  20-24%  profit tax, depending on nature of acdivity, for small legal entites defined by annual tumover tess  than TMM 72 million (US$  14,000), or less than 50 persons in  producing firm,s  or less than 10 persons in  trading fimts, or tess than 25 persons in  all other tpes of fimis.
Xg Lump sum  license for entrepreneur  without a  lagal entity and with annual tumover less than 72 million manats (US$14,000).
Lmswith  up to 50 emp!oyees ard tumover less than UAH  1  rtllion (US$190,000) can pay a  6%  gross tumover tax whith  does notexempt actor from  VAT, or  10% gross tumover tax which do exempt finm  from VAT Uzbeldstan
for FOI
0  mallysmal  trading enfteprises can pay 25%  and small production enterprtiss  can pay  10%  tax of gross tumover instead of entire set of nafional taxes.  Lump sum tax for individual entrepreneurs without a  legal entity.
tax discount amounting 30/o of new investmnents for SM4Es (in companson to 10% of new investmnrns for non-SMEs)33
While steps to improve the investment climate are important, the hardening of budget
constraints on all enterprises has also been key to the resumption  and sustenance of growth in
successful transition economies.  The experience of the transition economies in the 1990s
suggests that a sharp and early decline in aggregate employment preceded the rapid growth
of new firms.  This made assets cheaply available  to new enterprises, which was useful when
financing was not readily available and new investment was not forthcoming.  When the
proportion of employment in small firms reached a threshold of around 40 percent, the sector
evolved from being a passive receptacle for absorbing resources into an active competitor,
rapidly increasing its share of employment (see figure 12a).  In countries where aggregate
employment picked up, it did so after the recovery of aggregate output.  When the threshold
was not reached, people remained "unemployed  on the job" as in the CIS and some countries
in southeastern Europe.  Aggregate employment started to fall only late in the process  (see
figure  12b).  These observations  suggest a sequence where hard budget constraints are
imposed and the old sector declines before the new sector can grow.  The complementarity
between hardening budget constraints and improving the investment climate has been
extremely important.
Our next question for the commentators  is:
*  Is it generally  understood that hardening budget constraints for all firms and
improving the investment climate to create new  flrms and stimulate
entrepreneurship without the state dispensing  special favors to old or new firms
must go hand in hand?34
Figure 12a.  Index of GDP and Shares of Value Added and Employment
Accounted for by Small Enterprises,  1989-98
Czech Republic  Russian Fedeation
Index  Percent  Inedex  etnt
120  6D  120  o0
-0-  GW  nd9x
100  50  10  0  so
Value  atddd  by
eo  v  /  -40  WWna'I  80  40
,  <  ~~~~~~~~~~~~entavseas  as
6030  pfd  oso3 r  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~  C}  p~~~~~added eo  i  30  s~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~otatvt!u3  o3
40  20  40  20
Percentage  of
20  10  - yen  ssn  20  10
0  0  a  0
1989 1to  1991 1t92 1839 1894 1888 18M 1997 1988  1t89  1990 1991 1t92 1393 1994 1995  1ee 1997 1tee
Ukraine
Lithuania  tndax  Perctent
Index  Percent  120  6- 
120--  -*--  - --  60
-o-GOP  index  0  sO
100  <C  '505
ao /so  Value  added  by  eo  40
80  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~small
80  ~~~  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~48  __C3__.enterpnses  as  2~  0
percentage of  e0
60  30  total  value
oadde  40  20
40  20
_  Percentage  of  20
employees  in
20  10  small  flrms
5  0
o  0  19ee 1980 1991 ass  1993 1SM 199ss  Is  197  1998
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994 1995  1996  1997  1998
Hungary  Kazakhstan
Index  Percent  Index  Percent
120o70  __120  so
so  inde
a00  s0  Value added by  _  _  8  11~~~~~~~~~~~~mal8  40
40  -0ennaerprlses  as
t0  percentage  of  30
30  to8al value  60
40  20  Percentage of  40  20
-enaployees  In
20  1o  small frnns  20
o  0  O  0
1989 1as  1891 1992 1993 1894 19e5  199s 1997 1998  1989 1980 1991 1992 1s93 1e  19895  1928 1997 a993
Source: World Bank database  on small and medium-size enterprises.35
Table  12b.  Employment and GDP,  1990-98
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Source: World Bank database on small and medium-size enterprises.36
In light of this discussion, a major element of the agenda of tax reform  is therefore
o  to eliminate tax exemptions  which reflect governance  problems in tax
administration rather than being equity-enhancing,  as is the case, for
example, in Georgia where it is estimated that an additional 2 percent of
GDP could be collected from excise taxes on petroleum products and
cigarettes'9, and
o  to devise a simplified tax regime for small businesses which relieves the
administrative and reporting burden on the taxpayer and minimizes contact
between the tax authorities and the taxpayer.  The use of tax exemptions and
tax relief for such firrns is, however, not recommended,  in part because
potentially 50 percent or more of value added that is generated by small
firms in successful transition economies would then escape the tax net,
significantly worsening the govemment's  fiscal position without targeting
the particular failure, for example, insecurity of property rights or
inadequate infrastructure  responsible for impeding the development of small
firms.
This raises another question for the commentators:
o  What is the appropriate tax treatment of small flirns, which have been the key to
growth and generation of employment?  What poitical strategies are available
World Bank (2002b)37
to eliminate tax exemptions that benefit powerful  special  interests and to lower
tax rates and simplify tax administration that would benefit and encourage
compliance  by small firms?
6. ADMINISTERING  THE TAX SYSTEM
The fundamental  change which tax policy has undergone in transition as a result of
changing bases and instruments has required the development of a tax administration capable
of implementing those policies in countries where there was no such institution.  While many
countries now have modem tax legislation on their books, the development of the tax
administration  has lagged that of policy.  This is due, not only to a greater focus on changes
in policy rather than administration in the early years of transition, but also to the fact that
demands on administration  arising from changes in tax policy would usually precede
development of supporting institutions.  While tax administrations  in transition countries
share many problems with those in developing  countries [Bird and Oldman (1990),  Gillis
(1989)], mention may be made of several unique features of the post-communist  legacy, such
as
*  A culture of mutual mistrust between tax payers and the tax authorities;
*  No tradition of voluntary compliance with tax legislation;
*  No tradition of appeals to the courts against the decisions of the tax authorities
which, by enhancing trust in the fairness of the tax administration, would encourage
voluntary compliance;
*  No tradition of self-assessment,  which would shift the burden of appraisal  to the
private sector and reduce administrative demands placed on the tax authorities.38
This implies that much attention has been paid, not only to strengthening enforcement,
but also to developing taxpayer education and services  in order to improve compliance and to
maintain an appropriate balance between the two.  The former has involved, inter alia  (i)
making potential tax payers aware of the general concept of taxation and why they should
pay their taxes; (ii) providing assistance, not readily available to any but large taxpayers in
the private sector in transition countries,  to taxpayers  who wish to comply voluntarily; and
(iii) reducing compliance  costs through simplification of procedures.  Strengthened
enforcement is also an important factor in improving tax compliance.  By way of example,
the use of computer systems that can detect non-filers and those that have not paid the full
amounts due, and notify them of the need to comply, sends a signal to delinquent taxpayers
of the tax authorities'  capacity to detect and punish evasion.  Another example is the
compilation of databases  from third party information  from multiple public sources
(registrars of companies,  land transactions  etc.) and cross-checking of information between
the VAT, income tax and excise tax authorities,  as well as from private sources (sellers of
luxury cars, banks and financial institutions etc.)  about taxable transactions.  These help
provide independent  checks on the veracity of tax returns and identify cases where tax may
have been evaded.  Yet another example  is the selection of cases for auditing so as to target
scarce auditing and investigation resources where they can  be most effective.  International
constraints that impinge on tax administration  require additional skills, such as
implementation  of tax treaties with other countries  and the ability to detect transfer pricing
which shifts income from high-tax to low-tax locations.
Most transition countries have set up large taxpayer units to focus on those taxpayers
from whom the vast bulk of tax revenue would be derived.  These units, which have the most39
qualified staff, have proved to be important in maintaining revenue collections while the rest
of the tax administration is being modernized.
Evidence from the first decade of transition shows  that the most dynamic part of
transition economies are new or restructured enterprises  which employ fifty or fewer
workers.  As noted in Section  5, taxation is among the most prominent of the difficulties  in
the investment climate facing such firms.  It is therefore  extremely important that tax policy
and its associated administrative requirements  for such firms be simplified in order to
improve the investment climate while minimizing interactions between them and the tax
authorities.
While many weaknesses in tax administration may be addressed through technical
solutions, the importance of both development of civil society and political will to the
administration of tax policy is critical.  On the former, tax compliance will grow pan passu
with the development of civil society, which is much further along in the CSB compared to
the CIS countries.  On the latter, political will is required on two fronts.  First, political
support for hardening budget constraints  is essential in order to allow large tax payer units  to
go after the most prominent tax debtors.  Second,  a strong political commitment to a level
playing field for small enterprises  is essential  to simplify the tax regime applicable  to small
enterprises.  This sends a clear signal to foreign  and domestic investors that the authonties
are serious about creating an attractive investment climate.  Revenue-sharing  rules with
subnational  governments should also be structured  in a way that generates  incentives  for the
latter to encourage the creation of small and new  firms rather than focus on old enterprises
which are kept afloat through tolerance of tax arrears with implications for how the tax
administration  operates at the subnational level.  However, political commitment to effective
implementation  of tax policy should be distinguished from the use of the tax administration40
for political ends, such as selectively enforcing tax discipline on large tax payers.
Politicization of the tax administration  should be avoided.
Our questions for the commentators  are:
o  Is it generally understood  that in many states the tax authornides are a major
source of bureaucratic  harassment and weakness in the investment climate?
What can be done to overcome these problems?
O  Are the right partnerships in place or being constructed between the
government, private sector and civil society in order to foster a cuilture of
voluntary tax compliance in transition economies?
7.  TAXATION  AND FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
During 1996-1999  more than US$70 billion in foreign direct investment flowed to the
region, nearly 70 percent of it to the CSB countries  (Table 5, which also presents gross
domestic investment as a percent of GDP for comparison).  In the CIS countries  foreign
direct investment has been largely confined to the energy-rich countries, with Azerbaijan,
Kazakhstan and Russia receiving 75 percent of the total.  Russia's share of FDI in GDP was
even lower than that of several of the CIS countries, despite its considerable resource
endowment.41
Table 5. Main Recipients of Foreign Direct Investment,  1992-95 and 1996-1999
1992-95  1996-99
Memo item  Memo item
Gross  Gross
Domestic  $ millions  Percent of  Domestic
Investment as  GDP  Investment  as
a percent of  a percent of
GDP  GDP
CSB  21,091  0.5  19.3  50,558  3.3  24.7
Czech Republic  4,821  2.9  29.4  10,104  4.6  31  5
Estonia  647  3.9  26.9  1,050  5.2  28.2
Hungary  9,399  5.7  20.5  6,979  3.8  28.3
Poland  2,540  0.6  17.9  17,096  2.9  24.8
CIS  8,272  1.0  26.2  22,001  2.5  20.8
Azerbaijan  237  4.2  15.1  3,222  20.9  30.8
Kazakhstan  2,357  2.7  25.0  4,971  6.4  15.1
Russian Federation  3,965  0.3  28.1  8,412  0.7  19.6
Turkmenistan  427  3.5  - 334  3.0  43.5'
Averages of 1997-1999
Note: Shares of GDP are period averages  of medians for the group
Source: World Bank staff estimates and country statistical offices.
Much foreign direct investment was driven by the sales of assets to strategic  foreign
investors; indeed, cumulative  FDI is highly correlated with cumulative privatization
revenues.20 FDI brought with it two advantages:  first, technology and skills and, in some
cases,  the governance capacity and standards  of the home country and second, a source of
foreign financing which,  compared to bond and equity capital flows, was less prone to
volatility in international capital markets.
Figure  13 shows that higher cumulative foreign direct investment, often a good proxy
for a more  attractive investment climate in the host country (see World Bank (2002c)), was
associated  with a higher share of aggregate  employment in small enterprises.
20 EBRD (2000)42
Figure  13.  Cumulative  Foreign Direct Investment Per Capita and Employment in
Small Enterprises,  1998
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Improving the investment climate for domestic and foreign investment alike remains
an important issue for the CIS countries and those in southeastern Europe.  In the advanced
reformers  where few large privatizations are left, a major challenge facing policy makers is
to devise an investment climate that can continue to attract inflows of FDI into greenfield
ventures  and cross-border acquisitions of private sector assets, together with the associated
entrepreneurial  experience,  without undermining  the country's  fiscal position through the
provision of tax incentives.  Many countries-Bulgaria,  Estonia,  the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Romania  and Slovakia-have offered tax incentives,  employment subsidies and
special economic zones to attract foreign investment.  In fact, the provision of generous
investment incentives in the Czech and Slovak Republics  in 1996 and  1997 respectively was
associated with a doubling of non-privatization-related  FDI in those countries.43
Recent empirical  studies in developed countries suggest that the location of
investment,  its modes of financing and associated tax avoidance respond more strongly to tax
changes than had been  previously thought to have been the case21 . Moreover, candidate
countries for EU accession-the  Czech Republic,  Hungary, Poland and Slovakia-and,
indeed member countries of the EU, such as Ireland,  have successfully engaged  in tax
competition to attract FDI within their borders.  In such a situation,  countries with high
corporate tax rates face the potential for a reduction in FDI inflows and profit-shifting to
lower tax locations through transfer pricing by multinationals,  and may, therefore, be
tempted to engage in a race to the bottom through competitive reductions  in tax rates.
Caution is, however, warranted here. It will be recollected that the tax system, although
important,  is but one ingredient of an attractive  investment climate.  Furthermore,  the
interaction of tax and nontax incentives  on investment remains to be adequately explored  in
recent empirical work. Hence,  if particular regions of a country experience stubbornly high
double-digit unemployment  as is the case in Central Europe, the solution may lie, not in a
rush to tax holidays,  accelerated  depreciation  and the like but instead in directly addressing
the sources of the problem, which could include the provision of  relevant education
opportunities to match skills with labor demand, reducing disincentives to labor supply
arising from overly  generous social  expenditures, cutting the cost of labor by lowering
payroll taxes and removing impediments  to labor mobility arising from infrastructure
bottlenecks.  This may still leave a role for tax policy but governments should avoid the
temptation to pick winners and engage in activist industrial policy. That route can lead to
poor choices, subsidized  inefficiency and corrupt seeking after government favors.
21  Hines (1999) provides on useful survey44
This discussion raises the following  question for the commentators:
o  IBlow important  s it to use corporate tax regimes  im  transition countries to
compete for foregnm direct Investment as compared to hiarmonzig taxes
and focusing on broader reforrm of the Anvestment  climate?
8. CONCLUSION
To summarize, the discussion  in the paper raises the following  questions  for the
commentators:
o  What is the level amd composidon  of tax revemue that raises emough
resources to flnance puble expenditures without introducing  excessive
distortions in the private sector?  Es tax revenue as a share of GDP "too
high" in the CSB countries ansd "too  low" in the CIIS countries?
O  Es it generally  unmderstood that hardenimng budget constraints for  aRl  firms
and impirovi3ng the Investment ciAmate to create new flirms and stimulate
entrepreneurship,  without the state dispensing special favors,  must go
haDnd in hand?
o  What is the appiropriate taz treatment of small flirms,  which have been
the key to growth and generation of employment?  What political
strategies are available to eniminate tax exemptioons that beuneflt powerfuR
speciAl interests and to lower tax rates and simplify tax administiration
that would benefit and enmcourage compliance  by smaRll  flirms?45
*  Is it generally understood that in many states the tax authorities are a
major source of bureaucratic harassment and weakness in the
investment climate?  What can be done to overcome these problems?
*  Are the right partnerships in place or being constructed between the
government, private sector and civil society in order to foster a culture of
voluntary tax compliance in transition economies?
*  How important is it to use corporate tax regimes in transition countries
to compete for foreign direct investment as compared to harmonizing
taxes and focusing on broader reform of the investment climate?46
Apuendix  Table 1. Tax structure of CSB and CIS countries during the Early Transition Period'
(average in percent of GDP)
Taxes  cn Income,  Profite,  Sociel  )omesatcTaxes  onGoods andSerwnce,  lntemnetonal Trade Taxes
andCaptalOms  Secunty  of which
2000  GDP  Total  Other  and  Generl Sales,  of which  Wealth  and  Other
Sample  per  capita  Revenue  Tax  Revenue  of  which  Payroll  Turnover,  Import  Export  Property  Tax
Size  (USS)2  andGrants  Revenue  andGrents  Total  Inlcvidual  Corporate  Taxes  Total  VAT  Excises  Total  duties dutes  Taxes Revenues
Central  ashA  Easzaris
Europe  uid  the Balties
Albunia  1992-93  1,100  24.6  176  71  34  01  33  31  7.2  4.2  30  29  2.9  on  00  11
Bulgana  1992-93  1,470  378  310  68  97  52  45  119  68  36  32  2.5  25  00  00  02
Croateh
3
199495  4.180  42.5  4018  1S  45  37  09  137  IS1  140  41  40  40  00  01  04
CzechRepubhc  199495  4,940  444  403  41  103  50  53  158  115  73  42  14  14  010  13
Estoaua  1991-92  3,510  37.2  344  27  141  71  70  81  11 1  69  07  04  04  00  00  08
Hungary  1991-92  4,550  539  421  11  114  70  3.5  135  13.2  60  56  30  30  00  04  08
Latvia  199495  3,010  367  33 7  30  7  5s0  28  120  106  9.0  16  10  10  00  11  1.2
Lethuaruu  1990-91  3,040  399  35.5  45  130  46  84  69  137  105  31  05  03  00  0.5  08
Macedonia  1991-92  1,760  381  371  09  70  5.  12  19.2  8.2  8.2  00  2.6  26  00  01  00
Poland  1992-93  4,100  459  37S  81  126  82  44  9.6  101  92  10  26  26  00  29
Romama  1990-91  1,640  408  344  6.5  13.3  7.2  61  91  101  101  00  0.6  06  0.0  12
Slovak Rspublc  1992-93  3,540  452  37.9  74  13.2  55  77  10.3  124  104  21  14  14  00  0.5
Slovenia  1991-92  9,160  435  324  111  56  50  07  125  104  101  00  34  34  00  0.5
Unweighted Average -
CentrdlandEasteLm  3,50  4D  350  5S  97  43  113  110  2L  20  20  On  03  0S
CIS
Armenia  1994-95  500  238  129  109  64  13  52  18  3.5  30  05  0.5  05  00  03  0.5
Azerbaijan  1992-93  660  459  322  13.6  9.8  22  76  99  121  82  39  04  04  00  00  00
Belarus  1992-93  860  50.0  4198  8.2  121  00  121  129  16 7  DI  00  01  D0.  00
Georgia  1994-95  560  9.2  5.0  42  1.6  06  10  09  19  19  01  0.2  0.2  0.0  06
Kazakhstan
4 199495  1,230  18.2  177  06  56  63  36  14  14  00  09
Kyrgyz Republic  1994-95  270  247  20.2  45  49  19  31  59  78  51  16  0.6  06  00  05  05
MoldDva  1992-93  360  217  198  19  64  17  4.6  29  93  5.5  38  04  00  00  0S
RussianFederhaon5  1992-93  1,730  377  338  39  114  23  91  97  93  85  08  29  07  11  00  05
Tlostan  1991-92  160  342  32 4  1  12 4  26  68  9.2  95  4.2  5.3  01  00  01  03  10
Turkmerustan  1994-95  850  187  165  22  49  09  41  35  81  71  10  00
Ullnaine  1991-92  640  341  33.0  11  111  32  79  114  106  10.0  06  00  0.0  00  O0  00
Uibedlotan
7
1992-93  550  337  27.3  63  91  26  64  07  161  89  72  13  13  00  02  00
Unweighted Average -
CIS  700  293  4A  49  L  I  6  62  9  62  2  07  0UQ  0J1  02  03
Ororall Uicweighted
Average  2,180  353  299  54  83  3.7  5.1  09  10.1  7.5  23  14  13  0.1  0.  0.5
1 Consoidated GenerflGovernoeret  unless mdicated otherwLes
I At the officsal exchange rate
3 Consoldated Central Government
4 Goveansent Budgetasy  Operations
5  Enlarged  Government Budget
State Budget
t Excluhing extrabudgetasy funds
Sources  JMFcowtrv  documents. and  LA?and World Bank stafthmates4,
ADDendix  Table 2. Tax structure of CSB and CIS countries during the Early Transition Period'
(average In percent of tax revenue)
Taxes on Income, Profits,  Sociel  )omesticTexesonGoodsandService  Intemernonal  Trade  Texes
andCapeltGains  Secunty  of  whicK
2000  ODP  Total  Othet  end  GenerdlSdles,  of wiuch.  Wedth end  Other
Semple  per capta  Revenue  Tex  Revenue  of which  Peyrol  Tumover.  Import  Export  Property  Tea
Size  (US$)2  andGrents  Revenue  endGrents  Totel  Individual  Corporate  Texes  Total  VAT  Excises  Total  duties  duties  Texes  Revenues
Central  d Eastrn
Euzvpe and the Baltics
Albaria  1992-93  1,100  140.2  1000  40.2  191  03  18.  179  407  239  168  164  164  00  [O  59
Bulgane  1992-93  1,470  1219  1000  219  313  168  145  383  21S  115  103  81  S1  0O  on  06
Croelah
3 1994-95  4180  1043  1000  43  110  90  21  33.5  444  344  99  91  9S  0D  03  09
CzechRepublc  199495  4,940  110.2  1000  10.2  256  123  131  393  284  IS1  103  35  3.5  00  3.2
Estonue  1991-92  3,510  108 0  1000  80  409  20 5  20 4  235  32.2  19  9  20  11  11  00  00  2.2
Hungesy  1991-92  4,550  1279  1000  279  27D  16.5  S3  321  314  143  133  75  75  00  01  IS
Letvia  199495  3,010  1089  IDDO  89  232  14.8  84  356  315  267  48  28  22  00  33  37
Lithuane  1990-91  3,040  1123  IOO  125  367  131  235  196  386  293  86  13  15  00  14  2.3
Macedcna  1991-92  1.760  1026  1000  26  IS9  156  3.  51S  22D  22D  00  71  71  00  01  D0
Poland  1992-93  4,100  121.6  10I0  216  33.2  217  115  25.3  275  244  26  6S  68  00  77
Romene  1990-91  1,640  118  IDD0  188  386  210  17.6  266  294  294  00  1S  1  OD  36
SlovakRepubic  1992-93  3,540  1194  IJD5  194  347  144  203  273  322  27.3  54  37  37  O5  14
Slovenia  1991-92  9,160  1343  1005  343  173  153  20  387  319  31.2  00  105  103  0D  16
Unweishted Average -
CentrelendEasten  1540  1177  IOD  177  275  147  125J  315  3127  24D0  65  6  62  00  07
CIS
Armenia  199495  500  1848  1005  848  498  97  401  136  268  233  35  37  37  OD  2D  45
Azerbleajn  1992-93  660  1421  I1O0  422  304  69  235  302  375  255  120  12  11  OD  00  00
Belesus  1992-93  860  119.6  loan  19.6  291  00  291  308  399  01  0D  01  00  01
GeorgLa  1994-95  560  1833  1005  833  315  110  205  170  375  360  10  37  37  0D  112
Kzeakhsten
4 199495  1,230  1031  1000  31  317  354  201  78  78  00  49
KyrgyzRepublic  1994-95  270  122D  100D  220  243  92  151  292  387  250  79  30  3D  00  24  24
Moldova  1992-93  360  1093  1005  93  321  87  231  146  475  275  192  22  05  00  41
RussianFederaton'  1992-93  1,730  1114  1000  114  338  69  269  286  276  252  24  83  21  33  00  16
Tepakstan  1991-92  160  105.5  100 0  55  381  S0  20 8  28 3  29.3  13 0  16 3  02  0G0  02  10  30
Turkmenmstan
t 199495  S50  1133  1000  133  297  51  245  212  491  430  61  00
Ukriaie  1991-92  640  1033  IO0  33  335  97  238  344  325  302  18  05  00  GO  00  00
Uzbelasten'  1992-93  550  1231  1000  231  331  96  235  26  587  324  264  41  41  00  08  00
Unweighted Average -
CIS  700  1261  1000  268  33 1  77  24-6  219  37 0  28 1  97  352  24  03  0S  21
Overal Umweehtled
Average  2,180  1221  IOO1  )  22.1  30.2  115  18.1  27B  342  25.8  79  4B  4A  O02  Os  2.2
1 Consohdated General Govermment unless indicated  otherwise
2  At the official exchange rate
3 Consolidated Central Goverment
4 Govemmenit Budgetary Operetions
5 Enlarged Govemrnment Budget
6 State Budget
7 Excludng extrabudgetery funds48
ADDendix  Table  3. Tax structure of CSB and CIS countries
(I1999-2000  average;  in percent of GDP)
Taxes on Intorne, ProSts,  SocieJ  )omesbtc  Taxes on Goods and Servce:  Intemnattonal Trade Taues
and Capita  Gemns  Seruity  of wiuch.
2000  GDP  Total  Othe  and  GeneralSalesa  of which  Wealth and  Other
Sample  per capita  Revenue  Tax  Revenue  of which  Payroll  Tumnover,  Impost  Export  Property  Tax
sire  (US$92  and Grant,  Revenue  and Grants  Total  Indivdual  Corporate  Taxes  Total  VAT  Escises  Total  duttes  duties  Taxes  Revenues
Centrn  aid Easitern Europe  axid the BaltLcs
Albania  1999-00  1.100  219  189o  39  2  4  0.8  16A  37  81I  6.5  1.6  2  4  2  4  0a  a0a  1-5 Bulgana  1999-0  1,470  413  30.5  109  7.6  4-5  3  1  79  12 6  90  396  10c  10  a0  0a  1  6
Croatia
3
1999-00  4,160  41.3  39.3  29)  4.3  29  1  4  1324  18 4  139  4.5  2 7  2  7  0 0  0.2  0 3
CzechRepublic  1999-00  4,94  41 1  37.2  3 8  9 0  5.2  3.8  149  11 4  7 6  39  0  7  0  7  0  0  1.3
Eateinia  1999-00  3.510  38  7  36 1  2A  99  8.3  1,6  12.2  12 6  9 1  35  09o  00  a  0a0  0  4  1  1
Huingary  1999-00  4,550  440  36 1  79  93  7O  2.3  10 0  14 6  8 6  490  1.2  1.2  00  09  0  3
Latvia  1999-00  3,010  38 7  32  7  6  1  8.2  6  1  2  1  11.2  118a  80(  3  8  0  4  0  4  090  II  00
Lithuania  1999-00  3,040  31.2  29 4  18  89  82  09  79O  1290  79  3.6  04  04  09a  06  0.6
Macedonia  1999-00  1,760  36 1  32  4  37  69o  49  1.2  1098  11.6d  61  5.2  37  37  09o  0.5  09
Poland  1999-0  4,100  404  32.6  78  89  3-5  2.5  99  119  80  39  09  09  n0  20
Romanie  1999-00  1,640  32 4  305  29  798  34  39O  109  1035  63  2.8  1.3  13  00  00
Slovak Repubhic  1999-00  3.34  404  349O  64  81  32  29  12 7  10 7  76  3.2  1-5  1.5  09  10
Sloverni  1999-00  9,160  439il  403  22  79  64  1.2  136  15 7  13 4  0.  it  It  09  24
Unweiehted  Avecaxe - Central and
Eastem  Eucone and theBaltics  3-4  3L73  4  .7  7Z4  D  2,i  1,6  1  4  A  7  U  23  U3  Q  0  0.7
CIS
Annerna  1999-0  500  21.2  18-5  27  42  17  21  24  91  67  24  0s  0.8  09  04  17
Azerbayan  1999-00  660  199  144  5.5  45  22  22  24  47  4.2  096  19  19  09o  0.5  04
Belanus  199-00  860  442  409  3-5  79  09  79  10  0  19 7  1.9  1s  09  0.9  07
Georgia  1999-00  560  154  141  12  390  19  1.2  24  6-5  47  19  0s  09  09  1-5
Kazdlihstax,  1999-0  1,230  196  is81  1-5  696  3.9  69  07  07  090  0.2
Kyrgyz RLpublic  1999-00  2703  211  16 6  4-5  23  1.2  11  4.2  89  49  25  05  05  09o  02  03
MoldavaL  1999-00  360  27.5  3223  52  3,2  1.5  1.6  596  1096  72  34  1.5  1.5  09  12
RussianFedereleon'  1999-00  1,730  379o  3023  67  79  27  5I  81  8.9  65  253  25  0.9  14  1.2  1.6
Taplstan  1999-0  160)  139  129  07  22  1.2  190  12  64  38  0.6  14  14  00  015  1.2
Tudon.mirtim.  1999-00  8.50  23 4  208  27  39S  296  32  39o  9.5  73  2.2  05
Ukiraine  1999-00  640  342  30  6  39  8s  35  49  93  10  4  66  14  09  09  090  08  05
Uzbdeiistan'  1999-0  550  28  7  289J  07  79  39  49)  090  13.3  74  79  096  096  09  290  22
Uan&e"td Avergge -CIS  ii  2  .2  D  i  . 43  97  Li  2.  £2  II  DI  09O
OerrallliUweiglited Axraage  2,180  319  279  411  6.  39  296  7.7  11ll  7.6  311  12  1.2  0.1  0.9  0.7
C os  odated  G;et  al  Govemimeni wilesa indic ate d otherwise
2 At the  official exchange  rate
3 Consohdated Central GovemnmentL
C Government Budgetary Operations
'5Enlarge d Government Budget
State Budget.
7'Excluding extrabudgetaiy funds
Sourci3 IMP  cowahl7  documents, and IMF and World Bank staff eS5mala,49
AmDendix  Table 4. Tax structure of CSB and CIS countries'
(1999-2000  average,  in percent of tax revenue)
Taxes on Income.  Profits,  Social  )oastcTexesonQoodsendSermce  InternaslinnlTradeTaxes
end  Cac  Gaens  Security  of WItch.
2000 GDP  Total  Other  end  GeneralSales,  of which  Weath and  Other
Sample  percapita  Revenue  Tax  Revenue  ofwhich.  Payroll  Turnover,  lmport  Export  Property  Tax
Siue  (USS)2  andGrants  Revenue  andGrents  Total  Individual  Corporaee  Taxes  Total  VAT  Excises  Total  duties  duties  Taxes  Revenues
Centrlssan  E-stern tope and the Baltics
Aherani  1999-00  1.100  1217  1000  217  131  42  89  203  448  362  86  134  134  00  00  84
Bulgana  1999400  1,470  1354  IO  354  24S  148  100  257  411  29.3  Is  3.3  33  an00  51
CroBat
3
1999-01  4,10  1051  IWO  51  109  74  3.5  341  469  35.5  114  69  69  00  05  0
CzechRepublic  1999-00  4,940  1103  1000  103  241  138  101  401  306  203  103  19  1.9  00  34
Estorta  1999-10  3,510  1071  1000  71  273  229  44  338  34.  252  96  00  D  00  11  30
Hungary  1999.00  4,530  1217  10W0  217  256  194  62  277  403  237  1II  32  32  00  24  01
LAtvia  1999-00  3,010  11.5  1000  1.5  250  187  63  34.3  36.2  24.5  117  11  11  00  34  00
Lthunia  1999-00  3p40  1061  1000  61  303  277  27  6  23.6  408  267  121  14  14  Ol  20  19
Macedonta  1999.00  1.760  1112  10O0  11.3  184  147  37  33.3  35.6  188  159  11.3  113  00  14  OD
Poland  1999-00  4,100  1232  IOOD  23.  24.5  169  77  304  363  244  120  21  28  on  60
Romania  1999-10  1,640  1064  100  64  25.6  112  97  35$  343  205  '  92  43  43  oD  On
SlovakRepubhc  1999-00  340  1189  IOD  189  237  152  85  374  31.5  222  93  44  44  00  29
Slovenia  1999-00  9,160  106S  1000  68  181  151  3.0  338  389  381  07  27  27  oD  5S
Unweighted Average - Central end
EstewmEuroe dndtheBsltce  3,540  IO.9  2  0.  i42  Pi  - l  316  7  226.6  103  43  43  AD  La  2.4
CIS
Armemna  1999-00  5DO  1143  1000  143  227  89  114  130  48.9  362  127  43  43  OD  22  89
Azerbaqen  1999-00  660  1383  1000  383  314  153  160  167  328  2.9  31  132  1312  O  31  21
Belems  1999-00  860  108.6  1000  S6  192  0 0  19 2  24.5  48.2  43  43  00  20  1I1
GeorE;a  1999-00  560  1093  1000  93  214  13.2  S2  167  459  331  128  53  53  0.0  107
Kakhsten'  1999-00  1,230  1083  1000  83  36.6  203  380  39  39  o0  01
KyrgyzRepubhc  1999-00  270  127.2  IOO1  272  139  73  63  254  538  293  151  30  30  00  21  18
Moldova  1999-00  360  1233  IO0  233  142  69  73  253  47 8  323  155  6 6  66  O  6 0
Russian  ederation
5
1999-00  1,730  1221  1000  221  259  90  169  269  295  214  81  84  28  4.5  40  52
TyiEstan  1999-00  160  1054  1000  54  171  89  74  97  494  451  43  109  109  00  35  93
Tuekniemstan
4
1999-00  8  1121  1000  121  280  12.5  154  239  458  352  10.6  24
Ukraine  1999-00  640  111 6  100 0  116  28.6  114  16  0  30 4  33 8  21 6  4.6  29  29  00  26  1 6
Uzbeklstan7  1999-00  550  102.5  I1OD  2.5  283  138  143  00  347  265  283  20  20  00  70  81
Unweighted Avergge  -CIS  700  1153  1000  153  239  9  12  19ji4  44  10  1  l1  2_2  5-4  A  33  14
OveraUllUneightedAvewage  2,180  11t1S  I100  15.1  23.2  129  93  25.7  40B  285  108  5.1  42  02  2.3  2.9
1 Consohdated General Government unless  indicated otherwise
3  At the officidl  exchange rate
3 Consoidated  Central Goverfnment
4 Government Budgetary Operations
5Enlarged Governent Budget
6 State  Budget
7  Excluding  extrabudgetery funds
Sources IMl
7cowtry docwients.  aind LsFand World Bank st4fe5slmate50
Annendix  Table  5. Tax Structure of High-Income  OECD Countries
(average  for th  htBst5 years awailable; inpercentofGDP)
Taxes onIncome,  Profits.  Socul  DomestcTaxesonGoodsandServces  InternationalTrade Taxes
and Capital Gams  Secunty  of which
Fiscal  2Q00  GDP  Totel  Other  and  GeneralSales,  ofwhich  Wealth and  Other
Sample  per capita  Revenue  Tax  Revenue  of which  Payroll  Tumover.  Import  Export  Property  Tax
Size  (U1$)  andGrantse  Revenue  andGrarnts  Total
3 Indivdual  Corporate  Taxes  Total  VAT  Excises  Total  duties  duties  Taxes  Revenues
Austna  1995-99  23,300  50 2  43 2  70  131  168  123  0.0  00  00  01  0.9
BelgLum  199498  22,300  468  450  IS  169  13.  28  148  121  73  24  00  00  00  1.3  00
Denmark  1995-99  30,100  572  49.2  80  294  257  22  IS  159  96  38  00  00  00  17  04
Finland
5 1994-98  23,300  47.6  383  94  191  76  1.6  41  132  82  46  01  01  00  06  06
France  1993-97  22,000  472  422  50  8D  63  17  180  119  77  27  00  00  00  23  20
Germany  199498  22,700  476  378  97  110  9.6  0.5  152  104  36  30  0O  00  00  10  02
Greecee  199498  10,8D0  244  22.5  2D  74  38  2.2  05  12.  7.6  47  00  on  oo  09  08
Ireland  1993-97  25,200  37.  319  59  13.6  10.5  31  52  12D  62  50  00  00  00  11  on
Italy  1995-99  18,800  47.2  428  44  143  114  27  134  102  57  27  00  go  Do  09  41
Luxembourg  1993-97  43,100  477  428  49  16-5  111  50  111  111  60  46  00  00  00  3D  11
Netherlands  1993-97  23.200  50 0  43 4  66  12 0  84  3.6  18 0  10 2  66  28  00  00  00  18  135
Portugal  199498  10,600  417  3313  84  94  59  29  87  133  74  47  00  00  00  06  13
Spain  1993-97  14,200  369  333  37  101  8D  19  120  90  43  27  00  00  00  19  02
Sweden
5 1995-99  23,800  573  505  68  208  19  29  163  114  71  38  01  01  00  18  01
UnitedKingdom  1995-99  23,900  386  347  39  13.6  97  39  6.2  114  67  39  00  00  00  36  00
EU unwetihtod  average,  21600  45 2  39 4  52  143  9,6  26  103.  119  67  3 7  D0  O  0£  15  09
Austrahe  1995-99  20,300  360  289  72  159  117  4D  06  76  24  2.5  06  06  OD  41  00
Canada  1996-00  22,800  450  373  77  179  139  24  52  8S  26  09  03  03  00  40  11
Iceland  199498  30,600  391  327  64  119  109  09  26  146  94  32  04  04  00  25  07
Japan'  1991-93  37,600  211  178  34  82  51  30  54  29  14  13  03  02  00  07  01
NewZealand
8 1996-00  13,300  371  32J5  4.6  202  142  32  03  92  63  19  07  07  00  19  02
Norway  1994-98 36.000  529  41 1  11.S  15.2  11D  3.6  91  15.5  88  54  02  0.2  00  11  00
Switzerland  1995-99  33,3D0  425  340  8.5  12.5  10.5  0B  125  61  35  18  0.2  012  00  26  00
UestedStates  1995-99  35,600  344  276  69  133  IO  21  66  44  06  0.2  0.2  00  30  00
Other OElD  iunwcelsted average  28.700  3S5  315  7D  I4  111  25  53  Sh  49  2Z  0A  04  O1  25  03
lnweighedaverage:  24,70D  429  36.6  63  14A  10.1  2.6  89  10.7  6.1  3.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  IS  0.7
Consoldated budgetary,  extrabudgetasy  and  social secunty accounts of central  state/provincial and  local  governments
2 Excluding grants  and  trensfers between budgets of different levels
3 In additaonto  individual  and  corporate taxes  en  income, profit and capiWt  gain,  the  total includes otherunaflocated taxes on income profit and  capitl
4 In additin  to generd sales,  turnover, VAT taes.  and excisas, the total  includes profits of fiscl monopohes, taxes on specific servces, taxes on actvities and use/penrossion to use goods (business and  professional hcensees  motor
vehicle taxes, etc), as  well as  other taxes on goods and  services
5 Indivdual  and corporate taxes  on income, profits and captdl  gains are for consoldated  central government only
6 Central govemment  only Excludng adjustment to tax revenue
I Cantrdl govemment only
a Budgetary  accounts only
Source  J115  Govarnmeant  sancnal  S&ahshcs, OECD, Labor  9atl  scs  and Afatfonal Acount3 ofORCD CountIes5 1
Appendix  Table 6.  Tax Structure of High-Income  OECD Countries'1
(avrrage Sir the latest 5 years asallable; iheper'cent oftax revenues)
Taxes on Income, Profits,  Social  Domestic  Taxes  on GoodsaendServces  International  Trade Taxes
andCapitlflams  Security  of which.
Fiscal  2000 GD?  Total  Other  and  General Sales,  of which  Wealth  and  other
Samiple  per capita  Revenue  Tatx  Revenue  of which  Payroll  Tumnover;  Impost  Exp ort  Property  Tax
Size  (US$)  and Grants
2 Revenue  and Oruits  TotS?  Indivdual  Corporate  Taxes  Total  VAT  Excises  Toctal  duties  duties  Taxes  Revenues
Austria  1995-99  23,3030  116.3  10090  163  30-5  38 9  285  00  00  00  01  2(
Belgium  1994-98  22,300  1049  10090  40  37 6  30 7  6.3  32 9  2629  16.2  5.3  00  090  00  28  01
Denmark  1995-99  30,100  116 3  100 0  16.3  59 8  52.3  4.5  37  32.3  196  77  00  090  00  35  0;"
Finland&  1994-98  23,300  124.5  1009o  24.5  49 8  19-9  4.2  108a  36 0  215  12 1  02  0.2  00  17  1'
France  1993-97  22,0W0  111.9  1009  11.9  18.9  148  40  42 8  28 1  182  64  00  00  00  55  4,
Germany  1994-98  22,700  125 8  1009  23-8  29 0  254  1.3  40  2  276  9,6  7.9  00  On  no  27  0!
Greece  a  1994-98  10,800  108 7  1009o  87  33 1  17 0  9.9  21  57 1  33 7  2190  01  01  00  41  3!
Ireland  1993-97  25,200  118.5  1009  18.5  42.6  33 0  9.6  16 3  37 7  1915  155  00  00  00  34  0f
Italy  1995-99  18,800  110 4  100o0  10 4  33 4  266  6.3  313  23.8  133  6 2  00  00  00  290  91
Luxembourg  1993-97  42,100  111  4  10090  114  38.6  26  0  117  25  9  259  140  1  0.8  00  00  00  790  2t
Netherlends  1993-97  22.200  115.2  1009  15.2  27 6  19 4  8.2  41 4  234  15 2  63  00  09o  00  41  3'
Portugal  1994-98 10,600  125  2  1009  25  2  28.3  17 7  8.9  26 1  40 1  22.3  14 1  00  09o  00  17  31
Spain  1993-97 14,200  11I11  1009o  11  1  3015  24 1  58  36 1  27.2  12 8  81  00  09o  00  57  of
Sweden
5 1995-99 25.800  113.5  10090  13  5  41.2  3.9  57  32  2  22  7  141  7.5  03  0.3  00  3-5  01
UroitedKingdom  1995-99 23,900  111  2  1009a  112  39  2  280  112  177  32  7  193  11  4  00  09a  00  10.2  0(
EU  unweirhtecdaverage  22.600  114  9  1009O  149  36  0  242  790  266  312  17.8  flQ0  RD  0D  UD  39  2 
Austalia  1995-99 20.30  1249  10090  249  55 1  40A  139  20  26  4  84  88  22  2.2  00  14.2  01
Canada  1996-00 22,800  120  7  1009  22  7  48  1  37  2  64  14  1  23.6  70  24  07  07  00  10.6  21
Iceland  1994-98  3D,608)  119 6  10090  19 6  365  33 4  2.8  80  44 6  287  97  12  11  00  77  21
Japan
7 1991-93 37,600  118.9  1009  18  9  45.9  289  17  0  30  2  16  4  77  7-2  14  1.2  00  42  1!i
NewZealand
5 1996-0)0  13,300  114  1  100  0  141  62.2  - 455  11.6  19O  28.2  19 4  57  23  2.3  00  5.9  01
Norway  1994-98  36,000  128  7  10090  28  7  379  26  7  87  229J  37  6  21  4  132  06  06  00  27  01
Switzerlaknd  1995-99 33,300  1248  1009  248  362  30  8  2.5  36  7  180a  123  5.3  07  07  00  77  01
UrutedStates  1995-99 35,600  1249  100  0  249  48.3  39  1  77  23  9  160a  21  08  08  00  109  01
OthaefOECD urweighLedadverage  2870  123 1  100 0  221  46.2  353  88  172  26  4  147  68  12  127  00  89o  LS
Unaweighted  average:  24,700  117A  109.0  174  39.6  28.2  7.6  233  29.6  16.8  8.9  0.5  04  0OD  53  12
1Consclidated budgetary,  extrabudgetasy  and social security  accounts  of central, otaeprovunnial  and  local governments
2 Excluding grants and transfers  between budgeta  of different levels
3In addition to individual  and  corporate taxes  on incomne,  profit and capital  gemn, the total includes other unaillocated taes  on income profit and capital
4In addition to general  sales. turnover,  VAT  taxe  s,  and  excises, the total includes profits  of fiscal monopolies,  taxes on  specific services,  taxes oni activities  and use/permission to use  goods (businrss  and professonal licenses,  motor
vehicle taxes,  etc),  as wall  as other taxes  on goods  and services
Individtual  and  Corporate  taXeS on income, profits  and  capital gains  are for consolidated centreal  government  onily
6C entral government only  Excluding  aLdjustment to tax revenue
ICentral government  only
Budgetary  accounts  only
Source  IMF, Government FInancial  &atusfcs52
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